Radical typography
This is from the reprinting of Rorty's "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth" in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy volume on truth:
As Devitt rightly says, Dummett tries to infer from 'X knows the meaning of S' and 'The meaning of S=the truth-conditions of X' to 'S knows that the truth-conditions of X are TC', an inference which only goes through if we construe 'S knows the meaning of S' as 'there exists an entity which is the meaning of S and X is acquainted with it'.
So, in addition to inconsistency about whether or not to capitalize the initial letter of a quoted sentence, we have S, a meaning-bearing entity (maybe a sentence or statement?) capable of knowledge (self-knowledge, even, or at least knowledge of its own meaning) and X, a knower (and aquaintance of) meanings (such as, perhaps, a Xhosan person?) who has truth-conditions. What?
Comments
on 2006-02-05 13:23:49.0, Matt Weiner commented:
Moral: always call things with meaning and truth-conditions 'p' or 'q'.
and, further, on 2006-02-05 17:43:25.0, Standpipe Bridgeplate commented:
Looks like he got X and S figured out and made some progress structurally, and then he hit the brick wall of feminism.
and, further, on 2006-02-05 17:56:52.0, Michael commented:
err..
- X knows meaning of S
gotcha!
2.The meaning of S equals the truth conditions of X
Alas! A dense wood into which I cannot follow! (wasn't there some squab about continental philosophy being needlessly difficult to follow? I think I remember that. Of course, there is a possibility that this would become clear with context.)
Already confuzzed, my eyes glaze over at 3:
- S knows that the truth-conditions of X are TC
Because know S is a knowledge-possesing entity which has a meaning which is knowable. Ben suggests it could be a sentence or statement, but it is not obvious to me how such a thing could be said to "know."
I don't have enough footing to even hazard farther; I fear even my confusion would be confused.
a piddling typographical quibble: it seems to me that X, a knower (and aquaintance of) meanings s/b X, a knower, and aquaintance, of meanings
and, further, on 2006-02-05 18:00:22.0, The Principle of Rority commented:
You must interpret me as making Teh Sense!!!11!
and, further, on 2006-02-05 18:05:10.0, Michael commented:
these typepad comments always screw up for me...
Because know S is a
know s/b now
and, further, on 2006-02-05 18:08:58.0, The Principle of Rority commented:
"me" s/b "him", naturalorty.
and, further, on 2006-02-05 18:56:01.0, ben wolfson commented:
a piddling typographical quibble:
Oh, too right.
and, further, on 2006-02-23 4:05:18.0, Standpipe Bridgeplate commented:
Surprisingly, "naturalorty" is not AOTW googlaboogle.
and, further, on 2006-02-24 19:08:32.0, Matt Weiner commented:
It's sweet of you to credit me twice; but as for googlaboogle, if I have seen further it is only because I have stood on the nasal bones of giants.
I am still in the market for explanations of what the hell was going on there, BTW.
and, further, on 2006-02-24 19:15:03.0, Matt Weiner commented:
"Naturalorty" can be yahoo'd. Jeez, Google sucks.
and, further, on 2006-02-25 9:10:50.0, Matt Weiner commented:
Google has now caught up to "naturalorty," and in fact I have no reason to believe that Yahoo beat them to it.
and, further, on 2006-02-26 8:45:21.0, Standpipe Bridgeplate commented:
Well google my boogle!
As for what the hell, here's half an explanation. Lower-case standpipe was me, suffering from an occasional bout of handle disaffection. Of lower-case bridgeplate, I know nothing.
and, further, on 2006-02-26 10:08:32.0, Matt Weiner commented:
OK, that was what I thought it might be -- it seemed that a 'standpipe' impersonator should not be so bold as to use your e-mail address. You realize, though, that this just provides support to this thesis, subclass Slothrop/dispersion.
and, further, on 2006-02-26 18:26:14.0, Standpipe Bridgeplate commented:
dispersion
Peace be upon him.
and, further, on 2012-06-19 5:52:12.0, Morteza commented:
Every attempt I have made to construct an argument around such remarks turns into a travesty. The following attempt, suggested by Dummett's discussion of Frege's distinction between sense and reference (TOE 117-126; particularly 124-126),21 is typical (X is a competent speaker): (1) X understands S; (2) X knows the meaning of S; (3) The meaning of S = the truth conditions of S; (4) X knows the truth conditions of S; (5) X knows what the truth conditions of S are. Let TC be the truth conditions of S. .,. (6) X knows that the truth conditions of S are TC. No objection can be taken to (1). And the move to (2) is accepta- ble enough if (2) is taken as a mere everyday manner of speaking. However, if (2) is to be construed as requiring that there exist some entity-the meaning of S-which X knows in the sense that he is acquainted with it, then we should resist the move.