title!
Several months ago Adam Kotsko said this:
It's the same with people who want everything to be broken down into clearly defined arguments: I actually hate that. It seems transparently worthless to me, and I never condescend to formulate my ideas in ways that will satisfy them. Partly it's just a matter of not wanting to learn a new game -- just as I have never picked up a new video game in close to a decade, but am virtually unbeatable at Street Fighter II. But it's partly just that I recoil from the idea that my statements will be rejected due to formatting errors, or that the truth can fail to win out based solely on the contingent fact that falsehood was defended with stronger arguments.
After announcing that I'd reread Religio Medici, I actually start it again, though I didn't even get through to the second part (which means I didn't get to the really awesome lines like the one about standing above Atlas his shoulders 'nat); I did, however, get to that part quoted below, which when I first reread it seemed noteworthy to me since Taylor in Sources of the Self makes much of the rising importance of reason as procedural, and of demonstration by one's own efforts and resources, as opposed to a sort of reason that comprehends an external order, with the way one got to that comprehension being comparatively unimportant, and here's Browne saying, let's not rush in to ratiocination, since your grasp of the truth might not be equal to your ability to argue for it. (But why then are you certain it's the truth? Well—exactly, that's why it was striking.)
I have no Genius to disputes in Religion, and have often thought it wisedome to decline them, especially upon a disadvantage, or when the cause of truth might suffer in the weaknesse o my patronage ... Every man is not a proper Champion for Truth, nor fit to take up the Gantlet in the cause of Veritie: Many from the ignorance of these Maximes, and an inconsiderate zeale unto Truth, have too rashly charged the troopes of error, and remaine as Trophees unto the enemies of Truth: A man may be in as just possession of Truth as of a City, and yet bee forced to surrender; tis therefore farre better to enjoy her with peace, then to hazzard her on a battell. If therefore there rise any doubts in my way, I doe forget them, or at least defer them, till my better setled judgment, and more manly reason be able to resolve them; for I perceive every mans owne reason is his best Oedipus, and will upon a reasonable truce, find a way to loose those bonds wherewith the subtilties of errour have enchained our more flexible and tender judgments.
I wonder how often minds are really changed simply by dint of arguments, and how often someone is merely forced to admit that, yes, argumentatively he's been defeated, but he still thinks he's right. "Simply" there I suppose in contrast to an argument that additionally gets a person to look at the issue a different way, or to see not only that this particular argument has won out but that one's own position is unworkable, but that isn't proceeding simply by argument, it's proceeding by a good argument—the contribution of an another perspective isn't something superadded to the bare argument. (I read a not very interesting because sort of, to me, obvious article recently in I can't remember which journal that was lying around the library with a title that may or may not have included the word "manifest" that made the point that a lot of philosophical writing proceeds not deductively but more or less by saying "of course (usually not) X, just look at such and such!"; I can't remember, though, if the author thought that that approach was a species of argument or was to be constrasted with arguments traditionally construed.)
Comments
on 2007-01-10 22:12:35.0, bitchphd commented:
I think it's very seldom that people who still think they're right will actually concede an argument.
and, further, on 2007-01-10 22:18:37.0, ben wolfson commented:
Er, right. I know. That would be an instance of a mind not changed.
and, further, on 2007-01-10 22:22:05.0, bitchphd commented:
Right, but you contrasted "how often do people change their minds" with "or concede an argument, but not the point b/c they still think they're right." (I'm paraphrasing, obviously, not in fact quoting.)
and, further, on 2007-01-10 22:26:06.0, ben wolfson commented:
Oh, ok, I misunderstood. I think that probably happens more often than you'd think, though perhaps not explicitly—people probably come up with some reason to break off the argument, or make up excuses, or whatnot, rather than come out and admit that they've been outclassed but not convinced.
and, further, on 2007-01-11 14:57:33.0, ben wolfson commented:
The paper was "Telling It Like It Is: Philosophy as descriptive Manifestation", in American Philosophical Quarterly.
and, further, on 2007-01-11 23:11:49.0, bitchphd commented:
Probably it does happen in the way you describe; I was merely getting hung up on the explicit part.
Misunderstandings are our middle name.