Three great tastes—but how do they taste together?
They are, of course, the idea, apparently discussed here (I haven't read the book, but I did overhear someone saying that the idea about to be described is found therein) that thinking something like "gosh but I'm in a heck of a lot of pain; this sure is unpleasant!" rather than saying something out loud (say, to avoid waking one's sleeping partner) is a form of learned pain behavior just as is saying one is in pain instead of crying; the process by which our Rylean ancestors, post-Jones, learn to talk/think about and respond to their inner episodes (though in the aftermath of lengthy undigested stretches of the Philosophical Investigations one is uncertain what to make of "episodes" there); and the process by which our unreflective ancestors were taught to be able to make promises in the second (IIRC) essay of On the Genealogy of Morality.
I'm told (by the same person I overheard) that Finkelstein did his graduate work at Pitt, where he might have run into one or two fans of Sellars.
Comments
on 2007-03-05 18:27:56.0, dave zacuto commented:
By the final chapter of this lucid work, what's at stake is not only how to understand self-knowledge and first-person authority, but also & &
I'm amused by the use of "at stake" to mean "what is under discussion".