The myth of Sisyphus

When discussing criteria of personhood, one should marshal one's vocabulary with care.

On the Usefulness of Final Ends, last few bits of §8: Can something to whom its own condition and activities do not matter in the slightest properly be regarded as a person at all? Perhaps nothing that is entirely indifferent to itself is really a person, regardless of how intelligent or emotional or in other respects similar to persons it may be..  First sentence and three words of §11: Suppose there is someone to whom nothing is important.  Such a person ….

But … I thought you said …

(I'm sure he says something about really utterly selfless devotion somewhere, maybe The Reasons of Love, and probably doesn't actually think that entities that strongly resemble persons, and perhaps even used to be persons, but for their being comatose, aren't really persons, but, damn, that's some kind of criterion.  I also think it's kind of funny that throughout Necessity, Volition, and Love, The Reasons of Love, and Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right one sees the same arguments cropping up often in word-for-word identical form.  Maybe Scott McLemee's reference to Žižek in a discussion of Frankfurt was more right than he thought.  Or perhaps composition by copy and paste is just more common than I thought.)